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On March 24, 2003 days after the United States invaded Iraq, the Gallup Poll asked 
Americans: “Do you think going to war with Iraq was a mistake?” 65 percent of respondents 
believed war with Iraq was appropriate while 20 percent agreed that it was in fact a mistake.1 
These figures stunned scholars of public opinion, such as political scientists Amy Gershkoff and 
Shana Kushner who argued that when Americans expect a military conflict to be long, result in 
heavy casualties and have high economic costs, they would express their opposition to such a 
military action. In addition, since some Americans believed that invading Iraq might increase 
terrorist activity on U.S. soil, public support for the Iraq War in theory should have been 
relatively low.2 However, then President George W. Bush and his aides managed to cultivate 
public support over a period of nearly two years by portraying an impending invasion of Iraq as a 
necessary extension of the so-called “war on terror.”  
The United States responded to the attacks that killed nearly 3,000 people on September 
11, 2001 by launching a global war on terror. The U.S., with overwhelming support from the 
United Nations and America’s NATO allies, shortly thereafter invaded Afghanistan to overthrow 
the Taliban governing regime and root out the Al-Qaeda terrorists who found refuge in that 
country. However, many in President Bush’s administration argued that the post-9/11 
counterterrorism campaign must include the removal of Iraqi President Saddam Hussein (known 
to most of the world as a heinous dictator). Debates ensued on whether or not removing Saddam 
Hussein from power benefited the United States and its post-9/11 terrorism campaign.  
Some Americans such as Brent Scowcroft, the National Security Adviser under previous 
Presidents Gerald Ford and George H.W. Bush, urged the U.S. to avoid war with Iraq in his 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Frank Newport, “American Public Opinion and Iraq,” Gallup, December 19th, 2011.  
2 Amy Gershkoff and Shana Kushner, “The 9/11-Iraq Connection in the Bush Administration’s Rhetoric,” 
Perspectives on Politics 3, no.3 (September 2005): 525.  
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August 2002 op-ed piece “Don’t Attack Saddam.” Scowcroft argued that “an attack on Iraq at 
this time would seriously jeopardize, if not destroy, the global counterterrorist campaign [the 
U.S.] have undertaken.”3  Political officials recognized that in democratic politics, especially in 
the age of instantaneous global information technology, public opinion matters. In order for the 
president to launch military action, he needs the support of Congress and ultimately their 
constituents.4 Therefore, with different opinions circulating on whether or not the United States 
should invade Iraq, the Bush Administration successfully tipped the scales of public opinion 
heavily in favor of war, shifting the focus of American foreign policy from national defense 
during the Cold War (1957-1991) to international law and order in the 21st century. As the U.S. 
military was already deployed to Afghanistan following the horrific 9/11 terrorist attacks, how 
did the Bush Administration manage to gain support from the American people to invade Iraq so 
as to topple the regime of Saddam Hussein?  
 Before unpacking how the United States government cultivated support from the 
American people, it is important to understand why the U.S. initiated “Operation Iraqi Freedom,” 
the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Even those against the war, like Scowcroft, agreed that Iraqi dictator 
Saddam Hussein “is a menace…[and] we will all be better off when he is gone.”5 He brutally 
terrorized his own people and had often been an aggressor who launched two wars in the Middle 
East. Therefore, the United States shaped its foreign policy in the 21st century to reflect the 
changing times and turned its attention to eliminating global terrorism which, the Bush 
Administration argued, included Hussein’s Iraqi regime. Since the end of the Cold War in 1992, 
Americans no longer rallied around the goal of containing communism. Therefore, the focus of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Brent Scowcroft, “Don’t Attack Saddam,” The Wall Street Journal, August 15, 2002.  
4 Jon Western, “The War over Iraq: Selling War to the American Public,” Security Studies 14, no. 1 (2005): 107.   
5 Scowcroft, 2002.  
	   4	  
the U.S. as a global superpower had been unclear. The rising war on terror following the 9/11 
attacks turned American foreign policy in a direction that concentrated on eliminating the 
terrorist threat. 
 The Cold War fear of communism contributed to U.S. military involvement in the 
Vietnam War between 1965 and 1973. The U.S. failure to achieve its military goals in Vietnam 
caused many Americans to question the effectiveness of United States military action and 
foreign policy. Their subsequent hesitancy to support U.S. military action to achieve the 
country’s foreign policy goals led many to suggest that America was experiencing a so-called 
“Vietnam syndrome.” This Vietnam syndrome, which led many Americans to oppose global 
military efforts, supposedly ended in 1991 when the United States and its global partners won a 
lightning victory against Iraq during the Persian Gulf War. For the Bush Administration to 
galvanize public support to invade Iraq in 2003 as part of a war on terror, American citizens had 
to believe in military force as an effective means to achieve America’s foreign policy goals. The 
rapid military success in the Persian Gulf War essentially cured many Americans of the Vietnam 
syndrome, enabling the U.S. government to once again suggest military force as a solution to 
international challenges. The UN Charter that ended the Persian Gulf War included Resolution 
687 which required Iraq to destroy any weapons of mass destruction (chemical, biological, or 
nuclear arms) it possessed along with any material, such as uranium, it had that could be used to 
build such a weapon. With the lesson of the Persian Gulf War in mind, namely that war in the 
Middle East could be quick with minimal casualties, Americans were more likely to support the 
use of military force to invade Iraq in 2003. 
At the turn of the 21st century, U.S. foreign policy had to adapt to new challenges. The 
terrorist attacks against the United States on September 11, 2001 triggered a new era in which a 
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war on terrorism became the country’s main foreign policy priority. The attacks showed that the 
United States and other western nations were vulnerable to foreign adversaries and terrorist 
activity. The attacks on the World Trade Center in New York City and the Pentagon in 
Washington, D.C. intensified American anxieties and increased islamaphobia, a fear of Muslim 
peoples and their religion. Historically, Americans have been more apt to support war when their 
security was threatened. Therefore, post-9/11 foreign policy focused on eliminating terrorism as 
the U.S. government and military enhanced its role as a global protector from terrorism and 
leader of the free world. This role, some Americans believed, involved liberating oppressed 
peoples in order to grow freedom, democracy and free markets.  Thus, the evolution of American 
foreign policy from the Cold War to the post-9/11 era, from national defense to international law 
and order, encouraged Americans to support military efforts in Iraq in 2003.   
Neo-conservatism, an ideological movement that emerged in the late 1960’s, provided 
political justification for including the elimination of Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq in the war 
on terror. Neoconservatives believed that the U.S. should use American power, including 
military force, to spread freedom and democracy around the world. A free and democratic world, 
they argued, was in America’s national interests. Thus they believed that a free Iraq, liberated 
from its heinous dictator, would help modernize and positively change the Middle East, thereby 
eliminating the roots of terrorism in the region. As freedom spreads in the Middle East, the 
United States would have a greater opportunity to maintain strategic partnerships in the oil rich 
region, thus supporting U.S. national interests. Ultimately, the neocons in President Bush’s 
cabinet advised that the United States use its military strength to liberate the Iraqi people and 
democratize the country. Many Americans, however, needed to understand how Iraq, which did 
not attack the United States on 9/11, was connected to their country’s global war on terrorism 
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before they were ready to support invading that country.  Therefore, the Bush Administration 
emphasized the dangers of Hussein, arguing that the Iraqi regime may have weapons of mass 
destruction and that those weapons might fall into the hands of terrorists. By connecting Iraq to 
the war on terror and WMD’s through presidential rhetoric and strategic distribution of 
information, the Bush Administration convinced many Americans that their safety and security 
were threatened. Fearing for their safety, approximately 60 percent of Americans, according to 
Gallup, then supported the invasion of Iraq furthering the neoconservative agenda.  
Presidential rhetoric and the deliberate distribution of information, such as suggesting 
that the Iraqi dictator possessed illegal weapons of mass destruction, persuaded the public to 
support war with Iraq in order to ensure the security of the U.S. and the international community. 
President George W. Bush and his advisors deliberately created a link between Iraqi dictator 
Saddam Hussein and the terrorist organization al-Qaeda, the perpetrators of 9/11, to convince the 
public that simply containing Hussein in Iraq (similar to containing communism during the Cold 
War) would not eliminate terrorist threats. The Bush Administration feared that as long as the 
Iraqi President remained in power, terrorist networks had a lifeline in the Middle East. President 
Bush and his advisors believed that if Hussein continued to preside over Iraq then he would ally 
himself with the terrorists by supporting, and potentially arming, the extremists. With the support 
of Congress, President Bush launched a war on terror and deployed U.S. troops to Afghanistan 
following the September 11 attacks. Despite no direct link between 9/11 and Hussein, the 
speeches President Bush gave leading up to Operation Iraqi Freedom implied a connection 
between al-Qaeda, 9/11 and Iraq. Therefore, the Bush Administration was able to cultivate 
support for the war through strategic presidential discourse.      
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Additionally, NATO and many U.S. allies supported invading Afghanistan to overthrow 
the Taliban and dismantle al-Qaeda after 9/11. But the international community including U.S. 
allies such as the French, refused to support invading Iraq in 2003. President Bush insisted, on 
September 12, 2002, that the United Nations require Iraq to abide by the many UN Security 
Council (UNSC) resolutions imposed upon them following the Gulf War in the early 1990’s. 
These resolutions included dismantling their weapons of mass destruction (WMD) program. If 
Iraq refused to abide by these regulations then the U.S. had cause to declare war on Hussein’s 
regime.6  Trying to get a UN resolution in support of potential military action against Iraq, 
President Bush addressed the UN Security counsel declaring that: 
 
The conduct of the Iraqi regime is a threat to the authority of the United Nations, and a 
threat to peace. Iraq has answered a decade of UN demands with a decade of defiance. 
All the world now faces a test, and the United Nations a difficult and defining moment: 
Are Security Council resolutions to be honored and enforced, or cast aside without 
consequence? Will the United Nations serve the purpose of its founding, or will it be 
irrelevant?7 
  
 
According to President Bush’s address, if the Iraqi regime continued to defy the United 
Nations Security Council resolutions then the United States would be justified in invading Iraq. 
A November 8, 2002 resolution, UNSCR 1441, unanimously approved by the United Nations 
Security Council (UNSC), informed Iraq that drastic measures would be taken if they continued 
to defy their past requirements of disarming their WMD program.8 Thus, President Bush, 
concerned with the Iraqi’s housing WMD’s, declared war necessary to eliminate the threat of a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Eric V. Larson and Bigdan Savych, “Operation Iraqi Freedom,” American Public Support for U.S. Military 
Operations from Mogadishu to Baghdad, (California: Rand Corporation, 2005): 129.  
7 George W. Bush, “President’s Remarks at the United Nations General Assembly,” September 12, 2002. 
8 Eric V. Larson and Bigdan Savych, 131. 
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nuclear powered Iraq. Despite the UNSC’s resolution, French President Jacques Chirac, asserted 
that his country was opposed to any military operations in Iraq and would veto any resolution 
supporting United States military action. Feeling betrayed, President Bush stopped seeking 
international support for the invasion, focused primarily on domestic support from the American 
public and then launched Operation Iraqi Freedom.9 On March 17, 2003, American troops 
entered Iraq to begin the removal of Saddam Hussein.  
 With the goal to remove Saddam Hussein from power and eliminate the threat of a 
heavily armed Iraq, the United States government considered Operation Iraqi Freedom to be 
phase two of the war on terror. Following the terrorist attacks on 9/11, the U.S. almost 
immediately invaded Afghanistan, home of vast networks of al-Qaeda terrorists. Following this 
invasion, the Bush Administration capitalized on the momentum provided by the terrorist attacks 
and encouraged the United States public, through neoconservative persuasion and presidential 
rhetoric, to support invading Iraq. A couple of years later the Bush Administration invaded Iraq 
in an effort to continue the war on terror, arguing that Hussein must be removed in order to 
eliminate the systematic conditions that could lead to a greater terrorist threat.  
 
Brief History of American Foreign Policy in the Middle East 
In order to understand why the United States invaded Iraq in 2003, it is critical to 
understand decades of American foreign policy in the Middle East. During World War I, the 
Allied Powers consisting of Britain, United States, Russia, Italy and France, promised the Arabs 
in the Middle East their independence from the Ottoman Empire and self-determination if they 
successfully helped the allies achieve their goals. The Allied Powers demanded that the Arabs 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Eric V. Larson and Bigdan Savych, 132. 
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rebel against their Turkish master who sided with the Germans, a key player for the Axis 
Powers.10 Despite the Arabs cooperation, the Allied Powers neglected to follow through with 
their promises of autonomy largely due to the demand for oil and their support of Zionism, the 
Jewish national movement that sought to establish a Jewish homeland in the British-Mandate of 
Palestine. The Ottoman Empire that occupied a majority of the Middle East dissolved. Before the 
conclusion of the war, the French and British carved the Middle East granting themselves areas 
of influence and control through the secretive Sykes-Picot Agreement ultimately causing years of 
unresolved conflict.11 Therefore, failure to take into consideration the complex demographics of 
Middle Eastern peoples resulted in extensive conflict. This consistent conflict will continue to 
effect American foreign policy in the Middle East for the next century.  
 
American Foreign Policy during the Cold War 
The United States foreign policy in the Middle East after World War II reflected 
American internationalism, a global strategy to establish the U.S. as a leading force in the world 
and the region. American foreign policy rendered the U.S. as the so-called “Leader of the Free 
World” and that it needed to secure a new world order during the Cold War by maintaining its 
global footprint, especially in the strategic, oil-rich Middle East. However, this role did not 
appear over night and has been modified in order to respond to a changing world. During the 
Cold War, the main focus of U.S. foreign policy involved containing communism. Therefore, the 
presence of the Soviet Union in the Middle East during the Cold War encouraged the U.S. to 
facilitate strategic partnerships with nations in the region. These partnerships enabled the U.S. to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Phillip Knightley “Imperial Legacy” in Micah L. Sifry and Christopher Cerf eds., The Iraq War Reader (New 
York: Touchstone, 2003), 5. 
11 Knightley, 9.  
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maintain its power and limit Soviet influence in the Middle East. The United States prioritized 
containing the Soviets in the Middle East in order to protect its access to oil in the region. An 
example of the policies that the United States government instituted in order to protect its 
influence in the oil rich Middle East included the 1947 Truman Doctrine. Although the Truman 
Doctrine sent aid to Greece and Turkey, strategic countries just outside the Middle Eastern 
region, it acted as the “first of several U.S. military doctrines covering the Middle East and 
aimed at the Soviets.”12 Therefore, the U.S. used the Middle East and their role as global leaders 
to reduce Soviet influence, thus reducing the spread of communism.  
The focus of American foreign policy during the Cold War can be easily summed up 
using a single word; containment. The United States believed that it must prevent the spread of 
communism abroad to protect its global interests such as trade. Therefore, the policy of 
containment meant that the United States refused to allow the Soviet Union and its communist 
allies to increase its global influence and spread its ideology. At the end of World War II in 
1945, two major super powers remained in the world, the United States and the Soviet Union. 
The conflicting ideologies between the two ignited the Cold War. The Soviets emphasized the 
idea of communist collectivism where people lived and worked to benefit the society as a whole 
and were controlled by the state. On the other hand, American society focused on individualism 
meaning people had to be self-reliant with the freedom to choose their own path of action. As the 
Cold War persisted, containment weakened Soviet influence around the globe. Therefore, the 
Soviet Union increased “its willingness to follow U.S. foreign policy leads, as in the Gulf 
War.”13 The diminishing Soviet power significantly changed the world order especially in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Nikki R. Keddie, “The end of the Cold War and the Middle East,” Diplomatic History 16, no. 1 (Winter 1992): 
95.  
13	  Keddie, 96.	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Middle East. Because Soviet influence declined, it became “impossible for third world countries 
to counter the United States with Soviet backing,” a significant development in the new world 
order that allowed the U.S to invade Iraq for the first time in 1990 during the Gulf War.14  
But with its severe domestic problems and diminishing international influence, the Soviet 
Union collapsed in 1991 and American influence increased in the post-Cold War era.15 The end 
of the Cold War and the end of Soviet influence around the world allowed the United States to 
gain international support without the fear of an intensifying and potentially global conflict with 
the Soviet Union. The end of the Cold War was a necessary step in the timeline that leads to the 
U.S. invading Iraq in the 90’s and then again in 2003. 
 
Vietnam 
The emphasis on containment drastically affected United States foreign policy around the 
world. Containment encouraged the United States to engage in the Vietnam War with ground 
troops in 1965. The casualties and financial cost suffered by the U.S. with minimal successes led 
many Americans to regard the Vietnam War as an extensive failure for the Americans. No longer 
was the fight against communism the American publics main priority.  
The Vietnam War began in 1955 as North Vietnam, backed by its communist allies the 
Soviet Union and China, battled South Vietnam which was supported by the United States. At 
the beginning of the war, the United States primarily supported the South Vietnamese 
financially, giving them American military equipment along with training from military 
personnel and the CIA.16 After John F. Kennedy’s presidential election in 1960, the U.S. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Keddie, 96.  
15 Keddie, 100.  
16 Editors, History.com. "Vietnam War." History.com. October 29, 2009. Accessed May 10, 2019. 
https://www.history.com/topics/vietnam-war/vietnam-war-history. 
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government continued its involvement in the Vietnam War. Kennedy and his advisers agreed that 
a non-communist South Vietnam was crucial to preserving American global interests, although 
the Vietnam War was never the President’s main priority.17  
Following Kennedy’s assassination on November 22, 1963, Vice President Lyndon B. 
Johnson (LBJ) became President. Johnson preferred to focus on domestic issues, but as the fall 
of South Vietnam seemed likely in 1964, he elevated U.S. involvement by deploying full scale 
ground troops to Vietnam  in 1965. 18  Johnson galvanized public support for American military 
forces to enter the Vietnam War on faulty and deceitful information. 19 Johnson and his 
administration claimed that North Vietnamese militants attacked U.S. ships in Vietnam’s Gulf of 
Tonkin on August 4, 1964. The attack in international waters was later disputed and found not to 
have happened. However, this claim led Congress to pass the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution which 
granted the president authority to use military force. Johnson did so in 1965 and launched a full 
scale military campaign to save South Vietnam by sending approximately 175,000 U.S. troops to 
the region.20 Within two years, approximately 500,000 American troops were deployed on the 
ground in south Vietnam.21 As the war ensued, many Americans became frustrated with LBJ’s 
foreign policies and handling of the war. As thousands of Americans lost loved ones in the 
conflict and the astronomical cost of the war mounted, domestic support for the war effort 
declined dramatically. 
 Johnson’s successor, President Richard Nixon (1969-1975)  and his National Security 
Adviser Henry Kissinger, adopted a “new approach to foreign policy to match a new era of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
17 George C. Herring, From Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign Relations Since 1776, (London: Oxford University 
Press: 2008), 729.  
18 Herring, 730.  
19 Herring, 738. 
20 Herring, 739.  
21 Herring, 740. 
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international relations.”22 U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War ended through what became 
known as “Vietnamization.” Nixon began removing U.S. troops from the region thus pressuring 
the South Vietnamese Army to carry most of the burden of the fighting. Nixon shifted his focus 
of American foreign policy from containing communism to détente with the Soviet Union.23 
Détente served as a peace initiative with U.S. adversaries in an attempt to end the Cold War, a 
drastic change in American foreign policy. Nixon and Kissinger did not see détente as a 
complete abandonment of containment, but used it as a tool to influence the Soviets in other 
ways. The Nixon administration hoped this policy would improve relations with the Soviet 
Union and provide the backdrop for potential negotiations.24 The new policy of détente and 
Nixon’s “era of negotiation” demonstrated the United States reluctance to continue using 
military power as the means of achieving its goals.25 Détente also caused the emergence of neo-
conservatism, a political ideology founded on preserving American interests with free markets 
and individual freedoms. The neocons believed that conservatives like Nixon and Kissinger were 
willingly giving up the United States role in the world, a belief that eventually provided the 
political justification for the United States to invade Iraq in 2003.  
Additionally, the Vietnam War triggered many anti-war protests as millions of Americans 
grew to disapprove of a costly war that they came to see as a Vietnamese civil war rather than a 
proxy war between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. Furthermore, many Americans felt betrayed 
and lied to as government officials assured them for years that the war was immediately coming 
to a victorious end. A credibility gap emerged between the American people and the Johnson and 
Nixon Administrations due to public anger and distrust in the U.S. governments promotion of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Herring, 760.   
23 Herring, 770.  
24 Herring, 771-772. 
25 Herring, 772. 
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military action to achieve U.S. foreign policy goals. as the “Vietnam syndrome.” The syndrome 
refers to many Americans hesitancy to support U.S. military involvement around the globe after 
the disastrous casualties and strategic failures in the Vietnam War.  
American involvement in the Vietnam War resulted from Cold War foreign policy 
focused on containing communism. Therefore, 64 percent of the American public, fearing the 
spread of communism would threaten U.S. national security, initially supported the war 
according to a 1965 Gallup Poll. The support drastically decreased as the battles continued and 
numerous casualties became known to the public with little success.26 The war created a sense of 
“cultural shame” on the home front. The shame stemmed from many Americans realization that 
the optimistic belief in military invincibility felt during the early stages of the war “had not been 
based on knowledge, reason and justice.”27 Most Americans recognized that they supported U.S. 
involvement in a conflict they did not entirely understand with blind patriotism that ultimately 
cost the lives of 58,000 Americans and millions of Vietnamese.28  
The misguided, misinformed and morally confused public lashed out against U.S. foreign 
policy with anti-war campaigns and vowed to remember the lessons of Vietnam, to never again 
be blinded by unwavering patriotism, but to demand as Americans to be properly educated and 
informed on the reasons and motives behind using military force to aid in conflict.29 With the 
United States being plagued with the Vietnam syndrome in the late 20th century, the American 
public must be properly and extensively persuaded to go to war again. Therefore, in order for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 “Polls Tell Us No More Than Where We Are: Vietnam War Opinion,” The New York Times, September 7, 1988.  
27 John Carlos Rowe, “The ‘Vietnam Effect’ in the Persian Gulf War,” Cultural Critique, no. 19 (Autumn 1991): 
122. 
28 Rowe, 122.  
29 Rowe, 122.  
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war with Iraq in 2003 to be supported by the American public, the “Vietnam syndrome” must be 
eradicated. 
 
American Success in the Persian Gulf  
Fast-forward decades later and the rapid success of the United States in the 1991 Persian 
Gulf War portrayed a sense of dominance in the Middle East. This dominance would essentially 
eliminate the Vietnam syndrome that many Americans had experienced since the end of the 
Vietnam War in the the mid-1970’s. President George H.W. Bush and his administration 
essentially concealed the fears of another Vietnam with the success of the Persian Gulf War, a 
crucial development in the timeline that leads to the 2003 invasion of Iraq. In August of 1990, 
the army of Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait. The United States and the 
international community worried they gave Iraq the ability to control the global price of oil and 
that if portended further Iraqi military conquest, namely in the eastern region of Saudi Arabia, 
next to then Iraqi-occupied Kuwait.  
During President George H. W. Bush’s time in the White House (1989-1993), America’s 
priority in the Persian Gulf region was protecting the free flow of oil and to “prevent an inimical 
power from establishing hegemony over the region.”30 The White House received word that Iraqi 
President Saddam Hussein had amassed troops along the border of Kuwait on June 18, 1990. 
Iraq had previously accused Kuwait of driving down oil prices in the world market.31 The Saudis 
and the United States feared that Iraq threatened the oil-rich territory that bordered Saudi Arabia 
and Kuwait. Allowing Hussein to possess Kuwait and its resources would guarantee Iraqi control 
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of approximately 9 percent of the global oil production. Additionally, Iraqi military presence 
would threaten the Saudis, who controlled approximately 11 percent of the global oil production. 
This Iraqi threat would force the Saudis to follow the oil pricing policies implemented by 
Hussein in Iraq.32 The Bush Administration declared that their main goal throughout this Iraqi 
aggression was to protect Saudi Arabia.33  Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney traveled to 
Saudi Arabia to convince Saudi King Fahd to allow the United States to defend the Saudi 
kingdom from an Iraqi Invasion.34 After the king agreed, President Bush ordered approximately 
500,000 troops to be deployed to Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf so as to invade Kuwait in a 
military expedition known as “Operation Desert Shield.”35  
The United Nations Security Council supported the U.S. military efforts and helped to 
form a coalition to militarily eject Saddam Hussein’s armed forces from Kuwait.36 Before any 
fighting took place, President Bush issued an ultimatum to Iraq declaring that if Hussein’s forces 
did not exit Kuwait by January 15, 1991 it would face the coalition forces in a military pursuit. 
Hussein never responded to the ultimatum and his troops remained in Kuwait.37 “Operation 
Desert Shield” transitioned into “Operation Desert Storm” on that day as the United States and 
its coalition allies unleashed a fearsome bombing campaign against Iraqi military targets in 
Kuwait. As the bombing continued, coalition ground troops entered Kuwait on February 24 and 
defeated Iraqi forces in just 100 hours of battle. The advanced military weaponry used by the 
United States and its allies overwhelmed the Iraqi military. Hundred of thousands of Iraqi 
soldiers died while the United States’ suffered 148 casualties.38   
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On April 3, 1991 the Iraqi government and the coalition forces agreed to a ceasefire 
documented by a UN charter. The UN required the Iraqi government to abide by Resolution 687 
which declared that Iraq and Kuwait adhere to their boundaries. Most importantly, this UN 
Charter that ended the Persian Gulf War reminded the Iraqi regime that it is not to use or possess 
weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) including biological, chemical and nuclear arms as well as 
any ballistic missile with a range over 150km.39 A committee known as the United Nations 
Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM) formed in order to ensure the Iraqi regime abides by 
the imposed sanctions.40 The resolution required that the Iraqi government disclose the location 
of its WMDs and accept their immediate destruction. The UNSCOM provided international 
supervision to ensure that Iraq properly destroy its WMD program and any biological or 
chemical capabilities.41 Additionally, the International Atomic Energy Agency, with the help of 
the UNSCOM, ensured that any nuclear capabilities be destroyed and demanded that Iraq 
“unconditionally agree not to acquire or develop nuclear weapons or nuclear-weapon-usable 
material.”42  
Hussein’s regime resisted the sanctions imposed upon them following the Persian Gulf 
War, which allowed the Bush Administration to convince many Americans that Iraq continued to 
possess illegal WMD’s. Instead of abiding by Resolution 687, Iraq refused to comply until an 
end date was established that would free Iraq from these sanctions. The Iraqi regime often 
questioned the authority of UNSCOM claiming it was essentially an American espionage agency 
and that it had a disproportionate number of American and British inspectors.43 Due to Iraq’s 
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resistance to these inspections, UNSCOM was unable to verify that Iraq had fulfilled its 
obligation by dismembering its weapons of mass destruction. Thus, Iraqi failure to transparently 
destroy its WMD programs created an opportunity for President George W. Bush’s 
Administration to add a war aim to the 2003 Iraq War agenda. President Bush claimed, without 
proof or evidence from the United Nations, that the Iraqi’s continued to possess WMDs. Thus, 
Bush argued, it is the duty of the United States to eliminate the threat of a heavily armed Iraq 
through military action by removing Hussein’s regime from power. 
 
The Persian Gulf War as an Antidote to the Vietnam Syndrome 
The American public considered Operation Desert Storm and the liberation of Kuwait a 
tremendous success. With few U.S. casualties in a short and successful war -- the complete 
opposite of the Vietnam War in the 1960s to the 1970s -- the majority of Americans approved of 
the Gulf War and admired President George H. W. Bush’s leadership during this conflict. 
According to Gallup, Bush acquired “the highest job approval rating any president has received 
since Gallup began asking the question in the 1930s, with 89 percent of Americans indicating 
their approval.”44 This high public approval for U.S. military action in the Persian Gulf in the 
early 90s signified that many Americans believed that the U.S. was capable of efficiently 
achieving its goals through the use of military force, a substantial shift from American public 
opinion following the Vietnam war. This change in public opinion influenced President George 
W. Bush’s Administrations ability to cultivate public support to militarily invade Iraq again in 
2003. The United States needed approval from the public in order to continue its war efforts.  
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The Vietnam War demonstrated that poor approval rating and the publics discontent with 
the war abroad, makes for immense problems on the home front, thus, the emergence of the so-
called “Vietnam syndrome.” A majority of Americans rallied against the war in Vietnam and 
with approximately 50,000 American causalities, the public demanded to bring U.S. troops 
home. By 1971, 60 percent of Americans believed it was a mistake to involve our military in 
Vietnam.45 Due to the Vietnam War, many Americans opposed U.S. military intervention in 
foreign wars believing military force to be ineffective and costly. Therefore, the war in the 
Persian Gulf with minimal casualties and immediate successes acted as the perfect antidote for 
the Vietnam syndrome.  
On March 2, 1991, during a speech given to White House legislatures, President George 
H. W. Bush declared “by God we’ve kicked the Vietnam syndrome once and for all.”46 This 
statement insinuates a sense of relief from the president. Bush believed that the effectiveness of 
Operation Desert Storm essentially reduced the impact the Vietnam War had on the American 
public. The Vietnam syndrome became irrelevant to many Americans because now it was 
“contained between World War II and the Persian Gulf Victory,” allowing Vietnam “to be 
treated as an ‘anomaly’, a unique case of failure whose mistakes might be ‘corrected’ the next 
time.”47 The success of Operation Desert Storm led many Americans to naively believe that wars 
in the Middle East would end quickly with minimal casualties. Thus, in the wake of the Persian 
Gulf War, Americans became more likely to support going to war with Iraq in 2003 in order to 
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remove Saddam Hussein from power. Following the successfully executed Persian Gulf War, the 
American public’s reluctance to use military force decreased.  
 
The 2001 Terrorist Attacks Leading to the Global Counterterrorism Campaign 
The most significant event that enabled U.S. officials to galvanize public support for war 
with Iraq happened on September 11, 2001, the day that would transcend America’s global war 
on terror. On that day al-Qaeda terrorists executed a premeditated, violent plot against the United 
States, killing nearly three-thousand people.  
Led by Saudi exile Osama bin Laden, al- Qaeda is a terrorist organization that consists of 
Islamic extremists. al-Qaeda essentially launched war on the United States on 9/11 due to its 
anger about the U.S. presence in the Middle East, specifically anger towards U.S. support for 
Saudi Arabia. al-Qaeda viewed the U.S. as an enemy of the Muslim faith and believed that 
Muslims were in a vicious battle known as Jihad, the mission to fight for Islam and against its 
enemies such as the U.S. al-Qaeda executed terrorist attacks prior to their attack in 2001. They 
were responsible for the simultaneous bombings of the U.S. embassy’s in Kenya and Tanzania in 
1998 killing over 200 people. They launched a devastating attack on the U.S.S. Cole warship in 
Yemen on October 12, 2000. In so doing, al-Qaeda became a military adversary unlike any other 
that Americans had experienced. Since al-Qaeda was based in Afghanistan since 1996, the 
United States and its NATO allies responded to 9/11 by invading Afghanistan so as to dismantle 
the Taliban regime that gave refuge to al-Qaeda and that refused to give up these terrorists. The 
extremists practiced suicide terrorism meaning that they sacrifice their own lives in order to carry 
out their mission. 
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al-Qaeda’s suicide terrorists hijacked four commercial planes on September 11. The first 
two crashed into the Twin Towers, the tallest buildings within the World Trade Center located in 
New York City’s financial district where many Americans and international people worked. A 
third plane flew into the west wall of the Pentagon, the headquarters of the United States 
Department of Defense located in Washington D.C. When the passengers of the fourth plane, 
flight 93, realized they had been hijacked to serve in this suicide terrorist plot, they heroically 
stormed the cockpit. In response, the terrorists crashed the plane in a field in Somerset County, 
Pennsylvania thereby failing to destroy its intended target, likely the U.S. Capitol building in 
Washington D.C.  
U.S. intelligence agencies observed al-Qaeda terrorists prior to the attacks on U.S. soil. In 
January of 2000, al-Qaeda terrorists gathered in Malaysia for a secret meeting. During this 
meeting, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) was able to take surveillance photos and 
captured a picture of Khalid al-Mihdhar who would later fly American Airlines flight 77 into the 
Pentagon on September 11, 2001. 48 Along with the photograph, the CIA learned the terrorist’s 
full name and his passport number.49 George Tenet, the director of central intelligence at the 
time, later confessed that the CIA should have placed al-Qaeda suicide terrorist al-Mihdhar on 
the State Department watch list which would deny him entry into the United States. Instead al-
Mihdhar held a multiple-entry U.S. visa and entered the U.S. months prior to the attacks.50 Thus, 
U.S. intelligence agencies were well aware that al-Qaeda terrorists were responsible for the 
terrorist activity.  On October 7, 2001, nearly a month later, the United States, with support from 
NATO allies, began a bombing campaign known as “Operation Enduring Freedom” (OEF) that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48	  Amy B. Zegart, “September 11 and the Adaption Failure of U.S. Intelligence Agencies,” International Security 
29, no.4 (Spring 2005), 78.	  
49 Zegart, 78. 
50	  Zegart,	  78.	  
	   22	  
targeted Taliban bases that the al-Qaeda network reportedly used. The United States obsession 
with eliminating terrorist regimes and overthrowing Saudi exile and al-Qaeda leader Osama bin 
Laden intensified.51 A Gallup Poll conducted shortly after the U.S./NATO military action from 
October 19 to October 21, 2001 concluded that 80 percent of Americans supported ground troops 
in Afghanistan as opposed to the 18 percent of Americans who were unsupportive of these 
efforts.52 The public thus supported the United States military action in response to 9/11. But this 
2001 poll also revealed that 22 percent of Americans were categorized as “reluctant warriors” 
who would not have supported war with Afghanistan if the attacks on 9/11 never happened.53 
Therefore, the terrorist attacks clearly enraged the American people and persuaded them to 
support war with Afghanistan with overwhelming margins. The Bush Administration continued 
to channel American outrage and desire to answer 9/11 with military action to cultivate support 
for war with Iraq in 2003.  
Cultivating Public Support for the 2003 Invasion of Iraq   
September 11, 2001 altered the course of U.S. foreign policy. Since Americans tend to 
urgently look towards the country’s leaders during times of crisis for explanations and potential 
solutions, President Bush and his aides had a greater opportunity to shape public opinion.54 The 
terrorist attacks inflamed Americans anger and, for some, vengefulness. This unifying patriotism 
invoked a collective consciousness for the citizens of the United States which reestablished the 
nations mission, a sense of focus that had been missing since the end of the Cold War. 55 Thus, 
the terrorist attacks united the American national identity and the objective of U.S. foreign 
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policy. Not only was the U.S. going to focus on the perpetrators of the attack but “the only way 
to ensure that such atrocities never happen again, Bush decided for the United States, was to 
change the global context that had made them possible.”56  
The scope of the post 9/11 foreign policy agenda broadened rapidly in the weeks 
following the attacks. During Bush’s address to the nation on the night of 9/11, Bush declared 
that, “The United States will hunt down and punish those responsible for these cowardly acts.” 57 
This statement implied that the U.S. would focus on those who planned and enacted the attacks, 
explicitly al-Qaeda and their leader Osama bin Laden. However, the scope of the war on terror 
expanded on September 17, 2001 while the U.S. President addressed the employees at the 
Pentagon. Bush articulated that “the focus right now is Osama bin Laden… and his organization. 
But there are other terrorists in the world. There are people who hate freedom. This is a fight for 
freedom.”58 With these words President Bush revealed the focus of the United States new foreign 
policy. It was not enough to eradicate the perpetrators of the attack, but the United States goal 
was to end terrorism, a focus on international law and order. Therefore, declaring war against al-
Qaeda and the Taliban, the ruling body in Afghanistan that gave refuge to al-Qaeda, was simply 
step one of the elaborate plan to eliminate terrorist regimes. 
 
President George W. Bush’s War Cabinet and Neo-conservatism 
 As the new, intensified version of the war on terror emerged immediately after the 
September 11 attacks, Iraq appeared on Washington’s radar as potential suspects. President 
Bush, in his first formal address to the nation following the attacks, declared that “I have directed 
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the full resources of our intelligence and law enforcement communities to find those responsible 
and to bring them to justice. We will make no distinction between the terrorists who committed 
these acts and those who harbor them.”59 President Bush was determined to justify a link 
between al-Qaeda and Iraqi President Saddam Hussein, as he believed the Iraqi dictator 
“harbored” terrorists. The neoconservative opinion which focused on America using military 
force to be a global protector pressured President Bush to militarily liberate the people of Iraq. 
Neoconservatives favored using the strength of the United States military to remove 
Hussein from power and eliminate his influence in the region. Historically the neoconservative 
opinion on foreign policy had been focused on initiating regime change in Iraq through military 
action. Throughout the 1990’s, neoconservatives “were openly contemptuous of the disparity 
between US conventional military supremacy and presidential willingness to use it aggressively 
on behalf of the American interests and values."60  Additionally, the neocons believed that 
regime change in Iraq was a necessity since the Persian Gulf War. Many neoconservatives 
believed that Operation Desert Storm failed to complete the entirety of the mission. Because 
Hussein remained in power, the neocons determined the Persian Gulf War as unfinished and 
further condemned the Clinton Administration’s failure to remove Hussein from power.61  Many 
of these same neoconservative ended up in President Bush’s cabinet, pushing for war with Iraq.62 
They determined that the “root cause of terrorism lay in the Middle Easts lack of Democracy” in 
the region.63 Therefore, the neocons on the President’s cabinet convinced Bush that the war 
against terror and the complete elimination of al-Qaeda as a global threat had to involve the 
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democratization of the region which could start with the military ousting of Saddam Hussein’s 
regime in Iraq.64 Confident due to the quick military victory over the Taliban, the 
neoconservative mistakenly believed that invading Iraq would result in an easy and decisive 
victory.65 Thus, the neoconservative political ideology compelled President Bush and the U.S. to 
invade Iraq so as to democratize the region, protecting the world from terrorist threats and 
increase U.S. national interests abroad. 
 
Presidential Rhetoric Linking Terrorism and Hussein 
 During times of crisis, many Americans look towards the president to provide guidance 
and answers making presidential discourse a persuasive tool. Presidential rhetoric encouraged the 
public to support the invasion of Iraq by uniting Americans under a common goal, to eliminate 
the threat of global terrorism. This discourse, given through speeches and addresses to the nation 
or government employees, successfully persuaded the American public to support militarily 
removing Saddam Hussein from power. President Bush and his administration strongly believed 
that “any strategy aiming at the eradication of terrorism and it’s sponsors must include a 
determined effort to remove Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq.”66 Therefore, the 
administration persuaded a majority of Americans to embrace the use of military action as a 
means to accomplish U.S. foreign policy goals.  
U.S. intelligence agencies concluded that Afghanistan’s link to 9/11 was undeniable and 
obvious. However, “the administration simply asserted Iraq’s connection for the purpose of 
mobilizing public and congressional support for a war that otherwise would have been a hard, 
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even impossible, sell.”67 Iraq had no direct connection to the events that transpired on 9/11. The 
Bush Administration discovered during their initial attempts at mobilizing the American people 
for war that “the American public was largely predisposed to a focus on Iraq as the logical 
second phase to the war on terror.”68 In order to capitalize on this momentum, the Bush 
Administration deliberately created a link between al-Qaeda and Saddam Hussein. The Bush 
Administration encouraged Americans to expand their view on the war on terror to include 
regime change in Iraq. The presidential rhetoric used by the president mobilized the public by 
creating a link between Hussein and al-Qaeda, the perpetrators of the 9/11 attacks.  
American intelligence agencies determined that Iraq was not involved with 9/11. But as 
early as September 17, 2001, President Bush told his National Security Council that “I believe 
Iraq was involved, but I’m not going to strike them now. I don’t have evidence at this point.”69 In 
order to justify Iraq as another theatre for the war on terror, the Bush Administration “converted 
the reality of Osama Bin Laden as an avowed enemy of ‘apostate’ secular regimes in the Middle 
East into the fantasy of bin Laden as an ally of Saddam Hussein.”70 Despite their being no direct 
link, war promoters commonly referred to the 9/11 terrorist plot, al-Qaeda, and Saddam Hussein 
in relation to one another, a mistake that commonly occurs even to this day.71  
A majority of Americans agreed that Hussein was an issue with his deplorable treatment 
of the Iraqi people and his problematic influence in the Middle East. However, linking 9/11 to 
Saddam Hussein in order to cultivate support for war with Iraq misinformed the American 
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public, taking the focus away from Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda terrorists. The New York 
Times reported in September 2002 that “Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfield said today that 
American intelligence had ‘bulletproof’ evidence of links between al-Qaeda and the government 
of President Saddam Hussein in Iraq.”72 That same article concluded that “ the officials have 
offered no details to back up the assertions.”73 Therefore, the New York Times article implied that 
the administration attempted to connect al-Qaeda and Hussein. This connection came during a 
time that the administration tried to muster support on Capitol Hill and at the United Nations in 
order for the United States to engage in military efforts to overthrow Saddam Hussein.  
The administration argued, with no concrete evidence, that Saddam Hussein’s weapon of 
mass destruction (WMD) programs -- chemical, biological and potentially nuclear weapons -- 
was growing. Therefore, Hussein must be removed in order to prevent him from supplying 
terrorist organizations in the Middle East with weapons of mass destruction. The threat of 
Hussein with WMDs paralleled with the Bush administrations implied link between Iraq and 
9/11 generated American public support. The Bush administration went through “serious efforts 
to prove this link in favor of a strategy that focused on what it contends is the threat from Iraq 
posed by weapons of mass destruction.”74 Despite no evidence of Iraqi President Saddam 
Hussein’s involvement in the disastrous events, President George W. Bush was able to cultivate 
support for a war with Iraq less than two years following the attack. President Bush’s advisors 
concluded that they must develop a link between Hussein and al-Qaeda while convincing the 
public that simply containing Hussein and his WMD program to Iraq would not work. He 
represented a destabilizing force in the Middle East and he needed to be removed from power. 
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A major tactic in demonstrating a link between al-Qaeda and Hussein included specific 
and intentional presidential rhetoric. The President and his speech writers meticulously chose 
words and coined phrases that would persuade the public that war with Iraq was the logical 
second phase in combatting terrorism. President Bush never explicitly said that Hussein and bin 
Laden were intimately connected with one another. However, the language used in the 
presidential speeches essentially forced listeners to infer a 9/11-Iraq connection. The way the 
information was presented in the speeches shaped the way citizens interpreted the war on terror 
and a country traumatized by the recent terrorist attacks were extremely receptive to this type of 
dialogue.75 Several speeches made by the president following the terrorist attacks persuaded the 
American people to support the second phase in the war which meant regime change in Iraq.  
    On June 1, 2002, President George W. Bush delivered the commencement speech at the 
U.S. Military Academy at West Point. The speech clearly articulated that the U.S. President 
believed the second phase of the war on terror should be fought in Iraq. During his speech, 
President Bush addressed one of the goals of his administration, to convince the public that 
simply containing Saddam Hussein to Iraq would not be enough to eliminate the threat that he 
posed to innocent people around the world. President Bush declared that “containment is not 
possible when unbalanced dictators with weapons of mass destruction can deliver those weapons 
on missiles or secretly provide them to terrorist allies.”76 Therefore, in order to rally future 
soldiers as well as the American public to support war with Iraq, Bush convinced Americans that 
imposing sanctions and relying on the policy of containment to restrain Saddam Hussein would 
not be enough.  
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President Bush’s speech at West Point demonstrated the United States shift in foreign 
policy, the shift between national defense to international law and order.  President Bush’s 
patriotic rhetoric inspired the future American soldiers to be ready to act implying that war is 
once again on the horizon as a necessary component of the war on terror. The President 
announced that “the war on terror will not be won on the defensive. We must take the battle to 
the enemy, disrupt his plans, and confront the worst threats before they emerge.  In the world we 
have entered, the only path to safety is the path of action. And this nation will act.”77 This 
patriotic rhetoric during the speech highlighted the United States’ role of maintaining law and 
order around the world. Therefore, when speaking to future American soldiers, the rhetoric Bush 
used inspired the public to support invading Iraq so that the United States military can fulfill 
their role as global policeman.  The president used the opportunity to speak to future military 
personnel as a tool to cultivate support for war with Iraq. 
President Bush gave another speech on October 7th, 2002 titled “Address to the Nation on 
the Threat of Iraq” with the sole purpose of inspiring Americans to support military action. The 
President stated:  
We also must never forget the most vivid events of recent history. On September the 
11th, 2001, America felt its vulnerability -- even to threats that gather on the other side of 
the earth. We resolved then, and we are resolved today, to confront every threat, from any 
source, that could bring sudden terror and suffering to America. The attacks of September 
the 11th showed our country that vast oceans no longer protect us from danger. Before 
that tragic date, we had only hints of al Qaeda's plans and designs. Today in Iraq, we see 
a threat whose outlines are far more clearly defined, and whose consequences could be 
far more deadly. Saddam Hussein's actions have put us on notice, and there is no refuge 
from our responsibilities78 
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The rhetoric used in this speech cultivated support for military action in Iraq by 
harnessing the patriotism and anger Americans felt following the 9/11 terrorist attacks. The 
president does in fact differentiate between Al-Qaeda and Iraq by arguing that the United States 
are now more informed on Iraq’s potential to engage in terrorist activity. However, the reference 
to 9/11 motivated Americans to support military action in Iraq. Many of President Bush’s 
speeches from the period of September 11, 2001 to May 1, 2003 (almost two months after the 
U.S. had declared war with Iraq) shared this same pattern of rhetoric. According to a 2005 study 
published by the American Political Science Association, twelve out of the thirteen speeches 
examined referred to Iraq and terrorism within the same paragraph. Ten speeches positioned the 
words Iraq and terrorism within the same sentence. In four out of the thirteen speeches, “a 
discussion of terrorism preceded the first mention of Iraq, giving the impression that Iraq was a 
logical extension of the terrorism discussion.”79 Furthermore, this numerical analysis emphasized 
that Bush’s rhetoric forcibly implied a link between Iraq and terrorism encouraging Americans to 
support a war. Repeatedly creating a link between the words Iraq, terrorism, bin Laden and 9/11 
allowed the president to sway public opinion to support the invasion.  
Additionally, Bush included hypothetical situations in three speeches that encouraged 
Americans to imagine what damage could be done if terrorists got their hand on weapons of 
mass destruction. During a radio broadcast aired on March 8, 2003, days before declaring war 
with Iraq, Bush stated that “the attacks of September 11, 2001 showed what the enemies of 
America did with four airplanes. We will not wait to see what terrorists of terror states could do 
with weapons of mass destruction.”80 This rhetoric powerfully shaped public opinion by relating 
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Iraq and terrorism, with the added fear tactic of including the extensive destructive power of 
WMD’s in the conversation.  
Figure	  1	  
 
 The 9/11 terrorist attacks caused a surge of islamaphobia and many Americans feared the 
instability in the Middle East. This fearful feeling made some Americans easily receptive to the 
idea that the United States needed to militarily invade Iraq in hope that regime change would 
bring democracy and stability to the region. The political cartoon labeled as Figure 1 conveys the 
increase in islamaphobia felt by many Americans following the September 11 terrorist attacks. 
President Bush’s inclusion of hypothetical scenarios played into those anxieties and heightened 
fears. The first figure in the political cartoon displays a Middle Eastern man labeled “scary.” The 
second figure shows a person wearing a gas mask inferring the presence of weapons of mass 
destruction. This figure is labeled “scarier” demonstrating that something many Americans fear 
even more than the Middle East was WMD capabilities. Lastly, the third figure, labeled 
“scariest,” essentially combines the first two pictures into one creating the combination that 
many Americans feared the most, an Islamic terrorist with weapons of mass destruction. The 
hypothetical situations conveyed in President Bush’s speeches relate to the political cartoon 
	   32	  
above. He forced Americans to imagine the damage that could be done if harmful terrorists 
possessed these weapons, a terrifying thought for many Americans living in the post-9/11 era.      
Therefore, the framing of the speeches implied that United States enemies are 
“indistinguishable and allied by the use of terror.”81 The language shaped public opinion in a 
way that would support military action with Iraq as the necessary second phase of the war on 
terror. The rhetoric successfully harnessed the strong feelings of patriotism and anger felt by 
many Americans post-9/11 which cultivated support for war. President Bush’s National Security 
Strategy (NSS) published on September 20, 2002 laid out the specifics of the United States 
foreign policy. The NSS emphasized the goals of the global war on terror including that the U.S. 
must invade Iraq to attempt to bring stability to the region and reduce the spread of terrorism.  
Figure	  2	  
 
 Figure 2, a political cartoon titled 9/11 Memorial Year Two, demonstrates just 
how misinformed many Americans became due to the strategic rhetoric of the Bush 
Administration. The person in the cartoon looks quizzically at the monument that reads “70 
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percent of Americans now mistakenly believe Saddam was involved.” Essentially this political 
cartoon indicates just how successful the Bush Administration was in conveying the invasion of 
Iraq as a necessary phase two of the war on terror. Due to the intentional presidential rhetoric, 
President Bush led most Americans to infer an Iraqi-9/11 connection which was fundamental in 
cultivating the massive amount of support for the 2003 invasion of Iraq. 
   
An Iraq Syndrome?  
Despite the initial support for the invasion of Iraq, The Iraq War resulted in immense 
suffering. The United States endured a military campaign in the country for approximately eight 
years that proved to be a staggering strategic failure. In that time, the U.S. suffered numerous 
casualties and high economic costs. The neoconservatives and the Bush Administration failed to 
plan for the aftermath of the invasion. They neglected to come up with a plan for Iraq once 
Hussein had been removed. The removal of the Iraqi dictator essentially led to ongoing 
instability in the oil-rich region. Additionally, many Americans felt that there was a credibility 
gap between American citizens and politicians, similar to what was felt during the struggle in the 
Vietnam War. In order to gain support for the Iraq invasion, many Americans believed they were 
misled, misinformed and essentially lied to by the American government and U.S. intelligence 
agencies. The Bush Administration deliberately created a link between al-Qaeda and the 
Hussein’s regime without any evidence that a link existed. Intelligence agencies exaggerated 
Iraq’s interest in developing nuclear capabilities and claimed that the Iraqi’s possessed WMDs. 
A claim that insinuated Iraq was violating the United Nations Security Council Sanctions 
imposed after the Persian Gulf War. Additionally, the Iraq War was every bit as costly as the 
Vietnam War, arguably more so. The phenomenal strategic catastrophe beginning in 2003 
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completely destabilized the oil-rich region leading to ongoing instability. The combination of a 
U.S. military strategic failure and many Americans feeling as though they were deliberately 
misinformed reinstated a widespread reluctance to rely on exerting military force, previously 
experienced after the Vietnam War. Once again many Americans no longer depended on the 
military to exert its power in order to adhere to American foreign policy aims. Thus, the United 
States has potentially found themselves in the midst of a so-called “Iraq Syndrome.” 
 
Figure	  3	  
 
   Similar to the Vietnam War, support for the Iraq invasion declined as U.S. casualties 
and the financial cost of the war increased. Gallup asked the American public, during both wars, 
to assess how the presidents handled their respective conflict and to evaluate whether engaging 
in war was a mistake.  Figure 3 shows the results of the Gallup Poll that asked: “Was it a mistake 
sending troops to Vietnam?” When this question was first asked in 1965, only 24 percent of 
respondents believed that it was a mistake to deploy Americans to Vietnam. When asked in 
January of 1973, after the American military had been involved for eight years, approximately 60 
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percent of respondents agreed that it was a mistake. The Gallup Poll asked again decades later in 
2000 with a staggering 69 percent of respondents declaring U.S. involvement in the war to be a 
mistake.   
    Figure 4 
 
Figure 4 represents the response of Americans being questioned about the necessity of 
the 2003 Iraq invasion. The Gallup Poll asked: “Was it a mistake for the U.S. to send troops to	  
Iraq?” When asked in 2003, 23 percent of respondents determined that deploying U.S. troops to 
invade Iraq was a mistake. In 2008 Gallup conducted the same poll by surveying 1,016 adults in 
a telephone interview asking the same question.82 As casualties increased along with the 
financial burden of the war, 63 percent of the respondents declared that the invasion of Iraq was 
a mistake. This 2008 statitistic represented the highest “mistake” percentage that Gallup had ever 
recorded involving a war the United States was actively still engaged. This percentage surpassed 
the previous high of 61 percent, a statistic recorded in 1971 when the U.S. military was still at 
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war in Vietnam.83 Both the Vietnam War and the Iraq War, experienced a similar trend in 
support. Suppport was high in the beginning. A majority of Americans believed that the U.S. 
military was the best way to achieve its American foreign policy goals. As the wars continued 
with more casualties and limited success, American public support rapidly declined. Thus, the 
similarities between American public support during the Vietnam and Iraq wars suggests that an 
Iraq syndrome has emerged in the United States.  
 Representative Walter Jones (R-NC) exemplified the emergence of an Iraq syndrome 
with his changing views on the Iraq invasion, from supporting to condemning the use of military 
force. Prior to the invasion of Iraq, Representative Walter Jones suggested using a side dish to 
make an obvious statement condemning France’s lack of support for the Iraq invasion. With 
backing from Representative Bob Ney (R-Ohio), the chairman of the Committee on House 
Administration, “freedom-fries” replaced the term french-fries on cafeteria menus in all three of 
the House of Representative office buildings. Prior to the name change that took place in March 
of 2003, France opposed the United States’ foreign policy in the Middle East and Washington’s 
decision to invade Iraq.84 Later in his life, the same representative wrote over 12,000 letters to 
families of fallen Americans apologizing for his support for the Iraq War.85 This story 
exemplifies and reflects how many Americans felt during the course of the Iraq war which 
evidently is similar to the progression of public opinion during the Vietnam war. Thus, the 
United Sates may be in the midst of an Iraq syndrome.  
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